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Abstract
The original rent seeking game devised by Tullock, whereby the probability of winning a rent-
seeking contest is a function of the rent seeking expenditures raiseá to the power R, is solved
for any value of R~ 0. In particular, we show that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists
when R 1 2. The possibility of over dissipation of rents - which was conjectured in the early
literature for the case where R~ 2-- dces not arise in any Nash equilibrium. We provide a
tight bound on the amount of under dissipation of rents that arises in a symmetric equilibrium.
This bound explains earlier experimental work which could not be rationalized before. General
representations of symmetric Nash equilibrium mixed strategies are provided, as well as
numerical examples based on values of R 1 2 used in some of the recent experimental
literature.
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1. INTRODUCTION
]n Tullock (1980) the following interesting rent seeking game is described. Consider two
players who bid for a poGtical favor commonly known to be worth Q dollars (Q ~ 0 and finite).
Their bids influence the probability of receiving the favor. Let x and y denote the bids ofagents
1 and 2 respectively, and let ar(x,y) denote the probability the first agent is awarded the political
favor. The payoff to agent 1 from bidding z when the other agent bids y is
U~(~ly) z rc~,y)Q - x , (i)
while that of player two is symmetrically defined:
U:(Y i x) -[I - x(x,Y))Q - Y.
Because the politician awarding the prize may have other considerations, or because he
can only imperfectly discriminate between the bids (if bids are not made in the money metric),
the high bidder is not guaranteed the prize. This is a common assumption in (I) the principal-
agent literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Bull, Schotter and
Weigelt, 1987), (2) the political campaign expenditure literature (Snyder, 1990); and (3) the
literature on rationing by waiting in line (Holt and Sherman, 1982). Presumably, given y, the





xR , yR otherwue (x Z 0, y Z 0)3
where R 1 0. This specification has become standard in the rent seeking literature and other
fields, see e.g. Snyder (1990). The case where R- 1 is studied most (Ellingsen, 1991; Nitzan,
1991a; Paul and Wilhite, 1991), but it is of interest to consider other values of R, as in
Applebaum and Katz (1986) and Millner and Pratt (1989). Loosely speaking, the case 0 e R
c 1 represents decreasing returns, while R~ 1 repn.saits increasing retums to aggn~sive
bidding. While the two agent pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium is straightforward to
calculate from the first order conditions when 0 c R 5 2, this is not the case when R~ 2.
Consequently Tullock (1980) devoted a large part of his discussion to these latter cases.
To date, there are only conjectures concerning the ezistence of a Nash equilibrium for
R~ 2 but finite. Rowley (1991), in his review of Tullock's work, lists this as one of the three
important theoretical problems for a research program in the area of rent seeking. The problem
is not so much that the first-order condition for a maximum cannot be calculated; the problem
is that the symmetric (x - y) solution to the two player's first-order wnditions does not
necessarily yield a global maximum (if R 1 2 the symmetric solution to the first order
conditions implies a negative ezpected payoff, which is dominated by a zero bid). In such a case
the sum of the solutions to the first-order conditions exceed the value of the prize Q; there is the
false appearanceof an over dissipation of rents. Tullock (1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989)
devoted considerable attention to the case of over dissipation because of the induced excess
social waste; see Dougan (1991) for a critical comment, and Laband and Sophocleus (1992) for
estimates of the resource expenditures. In Tullock (1984) it was acknowledged that over4
dissipation may be due to a failure of the second order conditions.' In the vernacular of game
theory, over dissipation is not part of a Nash equilibrium. This notwithstanding, the possibility
of over dissipation is a recutTertt theme in the rent sesking literature.
In particular, Millner and Pratt (1989) examined the rent seeláng model experimentally
for the cases where R- 1 and R- 3. Due to the use of laboratory dollars, the strategy space
used in their experimcnt is discrete. For a prize worth 8 U.S. dollars they formulate two
hypolheses concerning the mean of the individual expenditures and the mean dissipation rates.
These hypotheses are stated in Table 1, together with the'u experimental results.' Both
hypotheses are rejected for either value of R, but at markedly different p-values. The p-value
for the R- 1 case is at least .015, while the p-value for R- 3 is at the most ]0~. Thus, Ho
is only rejected marginally for the case R- 1, while I-io is strongly rejected for the case R-
3. Baik and Shogren (1991) point out, however, that Millner-Pratt's null hypothesis for the c~se
R- 3 is not the correct one. The problem, however, is that the equilibrium to the game is not
known when R 1 2. Our paper resolves this issue.
z
Briefly considering the n-player variant, n z 2, the second order conditions fail if R~
nl(n-2), cf. Tullock (1984) (where the reverse condition is reported erroneously). Note
that for the case n- 2 the second order conditions are always satisfied. But it is easily
checked that for R~ 2 the symmetric solution to the first-order conditions yields U,(. ~.)
c 0, and hence is not a global maximum. Thus the two agent case is the most
interesting case to consider, because with n~ 2 the posited solutions obviously do not
make sense if R 1 nl(n-2).
The null hypotheses should be interpreted with caution because the experimental setup
of Millner and Pratt (1989) is not entirely congruent with the simultaneous move
n~uirement (neither dces it fit the altemating move version studied in Leininger 1990
a,b).5
Table 1: Millner and Pratt (1989) Hypotheses and Experimental Results
Iio Experiment Iia Experiment
Exponent R- 1 R- 3
Mean Individual 2 2.24 6 3.34
Expenditures (2.42) (-24.28)
Mean Dissipation 5096 5696 15096 849b
Rates (2.3T) (-13.37)
Number of Observations 146 100
More specifically, for R- 1, the symmetric Nash equilibrium is known, and the
associated expenditure and dissipation rates are readily verified to correspond with the
hypothesiud values in Table 1. This is further wrroborated by a recent experiment by Millner
and Pratt (1991) which shows that risk avenion can explain the discrepancies between the
hypothesized and realiud values in Table 1 for the case when R- I. A major benefit of the
results presented below is that we will be able to explain the discrepancy between the
hypothesiud values and experimental results for the case when R~ 3. The punch-line is that
the formula based on the first-order equations (which yields a rent dissipation of 15096) is
incorrect. In fact, there is not a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium when R- 3. We
characteriu the "correct" Nash equilibrium, and show that the results of the Millner-Pratt
experiments are in line with the theoretically correct Nash equilibrium mixed strategies. To this
end we mainly focus on the two agent case in discrete strategy space. In the last section we
consider a continuous strategy space by taláng limits of the finite game.6
Before we embark on this, we briefly review the approaches others have used to deal
with the R ~ 2 case. The approach in the existing literature is to modi~ the original gome to
remove the apparent over dissipation of rents. In his original contribution Tullock (1980)
suggested three modifications. The fu-st is to let R be infinite, which tums the game into an all-
pay auction. Within the rent seeking literature this version has been studied by Hillman and
Samet (198Tj. The complete charactetization of all equilibrium strategies has ber.n obtained by
Baye et al. (1990), and the equilibrium level ofr~ent dissipation is derived in Baye et al. (1993).
The second type of modification is to change the one shot game into a dynamic game. Tullock
(1980) discusses the case of altemating bids, and this has been formalized recently by Leininger
(1990a, b). In Corcordn (1984), Corcoran and Karels (1985), and Higgins et al. (198T) the
game is changed into a two stage game. In the first stage the number of participants is selected
such that, when the rent seeking game is played in stage two, the number of participants is
consistent with (almost) complete rent dissipation. Similarly, Michaels (1988) devises a setting
within which the politician has the incentive to adjust the exponent such that the first and second
order conditions are met. The third modification deals with asymmetries between the players.
This was briefly dealt with in Tullock (1980) and has been further investigated by Allard (1988).
Finally Nitzan (1991b) introduces coalition behavior on the part of the contestants. None oj
these contributions, though, offers o solution to the original simultaneous moue rent seeking
game when R~ 2. The next secdon provides this solution and relates it to the experimental and
theoretical literatures.2. SOLVIIVG THE RENT SEEKIIVG GA11~
Consider the two agent rent seelàng game with conditional payoffs and winning
probabilities as given in equations (1) and (2). The exponent satisfies R~ 0. Suppose a pure
strategy equilibrium exists. Given y~ 0, the first and second order conditions for an
unconstrained (local) maximum of U~(x ~ y) are readily calculated as





Q(xR 4 y~~ I(R-I)(XR t Y~ - 2RxRJ c 0.
(3)
(4)
Assuming a symmetric solution, condition (3) yields x- y- QRl4, for which condition
(4) is readily seen to hold locally for any R 1 0. Substituting back into equation (1) yields
U,(x - Y- QR) ~ Q(1 - 2); i- 1, 2.
(S)
Note that in this case U;(. ~.) is non-negative as long as R 5 2. Moreover, for any z,
y~ 0 the factor (R-1)(xR f yR) - 2R x" in the second order condition (4) is unambiguously
negative if R S 1, while it is positive over some interval to right of x- 0 if R~ 1 and
becomes negative thereafter. In particular, (4) is satisfied when x - y. Thus for R 5 2, the
symmetric solution x - y- QRl4 constitutes a Nash Equilibrium. For R ~ 2, U(QRl4 ~QRI4)
in (S) becomes negative and hence the first order conditions do not yield a symmetric Nash
equilibrium point (because one can choose x- 0 given that y- QRl4; and earn a higher
payoff. But if x- 0 is chosen, player two has an incentive to lower y to small e~ 0).8
Generally, the fust and second order conditions (3) and (4) fail to characterize the global
maximum when R ~ 2.~
In order to find a solution for the cxse R~ 2, we focus on the game with a discrete
strategy space. This yields a version of the game similar to that used in the laboratory
experiments by Millner and Pratt (1989, 1991).` Due to the use of laboratory dollars, the bids
are necessarily discrr,te, and thus the game is a so-called finite game.' Nash's (1951) theorem
guarantees that every finite game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium.~ It follows immediately that
the Tullock rent-seeking game in discrete strategy spact has a Nash equilibrium, possibly in non-
degenerate mixed strategies, for any R~ 2. While it is in general difficult to characterize the
equilibria, we may be more specific in this case. Note that for any strategy pair (x,y), the
payoff to the second agent is the same as the payoff to the first agent ifthe strategies played by
the two agents are interchanged; the game is symmetric. Recalling that an equilibrium is defined
to be a symmetric equilibrium if all players choose the same strategy, we may apply Dasgupta




Baye, Tian, and Zhou (1993) show that one cannot generally blame the non-existence of
a pure-strategy equilibrium on the failure of payofffunctions to be quasiconcave or upper
semi-continuous.
Although Millner and Pratt claim to be testing the Tullock model, the experiment actually
allows the rent-seekers to expend resources continuously over a small time interval.
Hence, the experiment does not formally test the original one-shot simultaneous-move
Tullock game. This problem is corrected in the experiments of Shogren and Baik (1991),
who do not rtject the theoretical prediction when r- 1.
The continuous strategy space (infinite game) is dealt with below.
The mixed-strategies may be degenerate, i.e., in the c~se of a pure strategy equilibrium.9
In summary, the Tullock rent seeking game with a discn~e strategy space certainly has
a symmetric Nash equilibrium, even when R 1 2. These results immediately raise the
following questions: (i) Can we characterize the equilibria for R 1 2, even though previous
authors have been unable to do so? In particular, is it possible to provide an ezplicit soludon
for the symmetric equilibria that arise for differcnt values of R? (ii) Can the equilibria of the
finite game be used to shed light on infinite game (o~ntinuous strategy space) equilibria? A
derivative question is: (iii) How do the answers to these ques6ons relate to the experimental
work reported by Millner and Pratt for the c~se R- 3?
We answer question (i) by employing a device which was first used by Shilony (1985).
The payoffs to the game will be written in matrix format. We then show this yields a matrix
equation which can be manipulated to yield the symmetric mixed strategy solution. Some
numerical examples and a special case of this procedure are provided. To answer the derivative
question (iii) we manipulate the matrix equation to obtain tight bounds on the equilibrium
dissipation rate. Question (ii) is answered by letting the mesh of the strategy space become
small relative to the value of the prize.
Recall equation (1) which gives the conditional payoffs for agent l. To obtain the
unconditional or expected payoffs from playing x, EU~(x), the conditional payoffs are
premultiplied by the (mixed-strategy) probability py that a particular y value is being played by
player one's opponent, and subsequently these are summed over y. Thus~ lo
Q
EU,GY) ~ ~ P, ~(x.Y)Q - X.
Y-o
Denote the expected payoffs to agents 1 and 2 in an arbitriry Nash equilibrium by v, and v,
respectively. In the case of a symmetric Nash equilibrium note that the players' expected
payoffs are identical, v, - vz - v(however, v need not be unique). The manipulations below
make repeated use of the following general result.
Tbeorem 1. In any equilibrium: (i) EU,(x) 5 v,, (ii) EU,(x) - v, when p, ~ 0, while (iii)
pj - 0 if EU,(x) c v,. Similar results hold for player 2.
A proof of this theorem can be found in Vorob'ev (1977, sec. 3.2.2., 3.4.2. and 3.4.3.).
For a symmetric equiGbrium -- which we Irnow exists by L.emma 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin
(1986) -- we can use equations (6) and (2) to restate the condition EU,(x) 5 v as
Q R
QPr xR f YR 5 vQx
(7)
Conditions (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 1 imply a complementary slaclmess-type condition for a
symmetric equilibrium of the form
V x: P~ ~ Ps RsR R- v; x ~ 0. ~~l
Y.p X 4 Y Q
Now note that EU,(x - Q) 5 0, and in fact EU,(x - Q) c 0 if pr.a c 1(and R is finite).
Thus in a symmetric equilibrium no mass will be placed at Q, i.e. p,.Q - pr.Q - 0. Suppose11
(without loss of generality but for ease of notation) that Q e N, and that x and y can only take
on the integer values 0, 1, ..., Q. Note that there are exactly Q oonditions ('7) for x s 0, 1,



























In addition to this Q x Q matrix condition, the following constraints must be imposed:
Q-1




Condition (8), together with the constraints (9) and the complementary slackness
condition (7') provide a complete, but implicit characterization of the symmetric equilibrium,
which we know exists by Dasgupta and Masldn's Lemma 6. These conditions form a linear
programming problem which, at least in principle, can be solved for (po, ..., po-„ v). We have
thus proved
Tóeorem 2. Suppose the strategy space is discrete. Then for any R~ 2, the Tullock rent-
seeking game has a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, defined implicitly by the
solution to conditions C1'), (8) and (9).12
In order to illustrate the practical utility of Theorem 2, we will investigate two special
cases: R L oo and R~ 3. The latter case is that examined in Millner and Pratt's experiments,
while the former is the discrete atrategy spaoe version of the all pay auction examined in Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries (1990; 1993).
We begin with the case when the exponent R~ oo and assume Q~ 1 for simplicity.
In this case the matrix expression in (8) becomes
I 0 0 ... 0
2
1 l 0 0
2
1 1 1 ... 0
2







It is straightforward to find symmetric e~uilibria if it is assumed that all p; 1 0. In this
case the matrix inequality (10) becomes an equality by Theorem 1. The lower triangular matrix
equation can then be solved through recursive substitution. This yields po - p~ -... - po-~ -
2vIQ and p, - pj -... - pQ, - 2(1-v)IQ. In addition to (8), conditions (9) and (7') have to
hold. For even walues of Q this restricts v E[0, 1], while for odd values of Q, we necessarily
have v- ll2 (see Bouckaert et al. for a proof of this claim).
Note that we may make the grid in the formulation of the game (7) finer and finer and
normaliu the value of the prize to be one by dividing all dolLv units by Q and letting Q tend
to infinity. The e~uilibrium distributions in this discrete game with r- oo then converge13
uniformly to the continuous uniform distribution, and the expected payoff vIQ converges to uro;
therc is full rcnt dissipation. Also note that equations (1) and (2) can be expressed as
Q- x ~fx 1y
U~(xly) - 2Q - x 4lx - y
-x jfx cy
which is precisely tht defuution of the all-pay aucáion (ef. Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries,
1993). It follows that the symmetric equilibria of the discrcte all-pay suction converge to the
unique (see Baye et al., 1990) equilibrium of the continuous strategy space rwo player all-pay
auction.
Next, consider the case of finite exponents. When 0 c R 5 2, the game has a
symmetric purc strategy equilibrium (x - y- QRl4) as discussed earlier. Because R- 3 is
used in Millner and Pratt's experimental work on the game, and as pointed out by Shogrcn and
Baik (1991) the 'solution" examined by Millner and Pratt is not really a Nash equilibrium, we
will focus on this case.' For R~ 2 and finite, the solutions to the game cannot be given in
the same compact form as the solution for R - m, although conditions (7'),(8) and (9) still
provide a complete but implicit description of the game and its soludon. For any specific values
of R and Q, it can be solved explicitly through linear progrdmming. We list some examples.
' Shogren and Baik (1991) state that the behavioral inconsistency reported in Millner and
Pratt "... is due to the nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium. In this case there is no
predictable behavioral benchmarks to measurc the experimental evidence against.' t~ur
Theorem 2, however, provides such a benchmark. Shogren and Baik are rcferring to the
non-existence of a symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium.14
(i) R- 3, Q- 1. Therc is one pure strategy solution: both agents bid zero and receive
v- 112. lnter alia, this result holds for any fuute value of R.
(ii) R- 3, Q 3 2. There exist multiple pure strategy solutions: (1) both bid zero and
receive v~ 1, (2) one agent bids uro and the other bids one with respective payoffs v~ - 0
and v~ ~ 1, and (3) both agents bid one and rrceive v~ 0. Mixed strategies whereby agents
randomiu over (some) of the pure strategy solutions exist as well.














It is readily verified that (po, p~, p~ ~(-;-, ~, ~r) and v- 14 satisfy condition (12) and the
other conditions of Theorem 2, and hence constitute an equilibrium to the game.
(iv) R- 3, Q- 4. This case is alrcady too cumbersome to solve by hand, so we relied
on the analydcal computer program 'Derive" to solve this game. It can be checked that there
are two symmetric solutions: (i) (po, pi, p2, P~ -( 14, 0, 14, Ol with v--3f-, and15
(ii) (Ao~ P~, Pi~ P~) - f 38~ 0' 38'
O1 with v'
19 ~
For R~ 3 and Q~ 4, one genetally finds that all probability mass is loaded on the first
few probabilities q, with most mass lo~aded on the higher q's, and 0 t v c 1. For Q~ 15
the computational burden incre~ases rapidly and exact solutions take an excessive amount of
computer time. This is a bit unfortunate berause the experiment conducted by Millner and Pratt
(1989) used R- 3 and a grid of Q- 80 (at the end of the experiment the laboratory dollars
were converted into U. S. dollars at an exchange rate of 10. But subject payments were also
rounded to the nearest 25 cents, generating a grid of 32 with unequal grid sizes). Their
hypotheses and tests, however, all concern mean individual expenditures and mean dissipation
rates. The question therefore is whether we have something to offer concerning these quantities,
without explicitly calculating the solutions.'
71ie expected individual expenditures and the expected dissipation rates can be calculated
from equation (6). Note that premultiplication of EU,(x) by p, and summation over x gives the
expected equilibrium payoff to player 1 in a symmetric equilibrium:
' In future work it may be of interest to repeat the experiment for R- 3 and Q small such
that all the properties of the symmetric equilibrium can be evaluated, i.e. the values of
the p,'s.16
Q Q Q Q (13) EU, -~ P, EU~4r) -~ P. ~ P, tGY,y)Q - x -~ P~v ` v,
x-0 x-0 y-0 x~0
berzuse player one only loads mass on those x's which generate the same (highesy expected
payoff equal to v (see Theorem 1 above).
In order to dispel the claim by Millner and Pratt that over dissipation ofrents is expeated
when R~ 2, first note that if agent 1 chooses x~ 0 with probability 1, then
Q
EU, -~ P,~(o,Y) Q' Po 2 Q Z 0.
y~o
(14)
Hence each player can guarantee a non-negative expected payoff. Secondly, the expected
dissipation rate is easily calculated from EU, t EUT. Note that
v, ~ EU, - Prob{agtnt 1 wins} Q- x,
where x -~p~r is the average individual expenditure. Adding up yields
v, . v2 -[Prob{agent 1 wins} . Prob{agent Z wtns}] Q- x- y.
But since the prize is always awarded, there is always a winning agent and hence by (14)
o s v, ~vi-Q-x-y, (is~




We have thus proved:
Theor~ 3. The two player finite rent sceláng game devised by Tullock never involves over
dissipation in any (possibly mixed-strategy) Nash oquilibrium for any R~ 0. That is, D 5 1
always.
The dissipadon rate is also bounded from below. But in contrast with the upper bound,
the lower bound depends on the value of the exponent R. This can be easily seen by
investigating the two limiting cases R- 0 and R - oo. In the former case there is no
dissipation, while in the latter case dissipation can be complete. Therefore, we will investigate
specific values of R. To explain the Millner-Pratt ezperimental results for the case R- 3, one
requires precise information about the size ofD, and hence the tighter the lower bound on D the
better. ]t is not too difficult to show for Q~ 2, R~ 2, that in any equilibrium the dissipation
rate is at least 5096. With more effort, for Q 1 3 a sharper lower bound for the symmetric
equilibria is obtained in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. In any symmetric Nash oquiGbrium of the two player Tullock rent-seeking game
with ~ ~ R~ 2 and ~ 1 Q~ 2, the dissipation rate is bounded from below by 1-~-.ts
ProoG The proof comes in two parts. In part 1 we auume that p~ ~ 0, and show that this
implies v 5 1. Hertct D 2 1- 2IQ. In part 2 we show that pb ~ 0 necessarily. Some of the
computations for part 2 arc relegated to the Appendix.
Part 1. Suppose that p, 1 0. Then (by 7lieorem 1) for x~ 0 condition (~ ne~ly
beromes an e~uality: po ~ 2vIQ, so that v ~ Qpol2. Because po is bounded above by 1, v is
bounded above by Q12. This implies D Z 0. To improve the upper bound on v, i.e. to lower
it fmm Ql2 to 1, we continue the presumption pp 1 0. From condition (~, for x- 1 we have
po ~ a 5 yQ 1; 0 5 a G~.
To sce this note that all the probabilities r(l,y) except the first in the second row of
matrix condition (8) are less than or oqual to 112. Combine the prrsumption pa - 2vIQ with
the above inequality to get
as Q-Q. (1~
Hemce 1- v 2 aQ z 0. Theroforo 1 2 v.
Pa~t 2. We now show po ~ 0 necessarily. Let x be the first row for which p, ~ 0, x
;c 0, i.e. pb ~... z PI-~ - 0. Then condidon ('n holds as an equality for this row, i.e.19
R R 1 x x V t X
2 p,. xR}(Z~l~p,,, }... ~ xR~(Q-I~pQ-, - Q~ (18)
We will show that v~ 1 and pb ~ 0 are incompatible. For x f 1, condition (~ rads
as follows:
(xtl~ ~ 1 a. t (x~l~ 5 v}1 tX
(z~lj' r xR p' 2 p'~' (z;11R .(Q-1~ pQ-~ Q
(19)
Compute p~ from the equality (18), and substitute this into the weak inequality (19). This
yields the following weak inequality:
1 - 2 (x~l)R xR
2 (x;l)R ~ xR xA ~ (x~l~, P,.~ ~ ...t
G~'1)R {(Q-1)" - 2(Z}1~ } XR xR 4(Q-1~ pQ.~ 5
L ~;1)R ~~t~ xR J
5 Q {v~l {x - 2(vtx) (x ~l~x }.
r ~ R
In the Appendix we manipulate the two sides of inequality (20) to show that the left-hand-side
is non-negative while the right-hand side is strictly negative. (Note that the proof would be
particularly simple if R- oo, since then (20) reduces to 0 5 -~- p,,, 5(1-v-x)IQ). This yields
a contradiction so that the supposition po - 0 and v Z 1 are incompatible.) Q.E.D.
3. 11SII.LNER AND P'RATT REVISITED
How do the above theoretical results compare with the experimental evidence reported
by Millner and Pratt (1989)? Note that for Q large Theorems 3 and 4 provide tight bounds.
In particular, given the values of R~ 3 and Q a 80 used in the Millner and Pratt experiments,Zo
the symmevic (mixod-strategy) equióbrium expected outlays are z~ y- 3.9 (after catversion
to U.S. dollars) and the corraponding interval for the expecKed rent dissipation is D E[97.596,
10096] -- it is not the 150 percent dissipation rate used as the null hypothesis by Millner and
Pratt. Using the experimental evidence reported by Millner and Pratt we find the following t-
statistícs for the null hypotheses: -5.11 and -2.73 respectively' Compare these to the values
reported by Millner and Pratt and reproduced in Table 1 above. (If the rounding to the nearest
25 cents in the actual payout is taken into acoount, the mean dissipation rate is reducod to
approximately 93.75, which does not differ significantly from the experimental result at the 596
level.) Note that these t-statistics are of the same order of magnitude as those for the case R-
1. Also rocall the rectnt experimental work by Millner and Pratt (1991) which relates the
relatively small discrepancy for the case R- 1 to the ezistence of risk aversion.'o Our
cx]njecture is that the remaining discrepancy for the case R - 3 can be explained in a similar
way. Importantly, though, the above shows that when the correct symmetric (mixed-strategy)
Nash equilibrium is used as the theonr.tical benchmark to form the null hypothesis, Millner and
Pratt's empirical results for the case R- 3 and Q- 80 accord well with state-of-the art rent-
setking theory. Individuals seem to behave quite efficiently after all.
' Calculations are based on (3.34 - 3.9)Is, --5.11 and (84 - 97.5)Is2 - -2.73, where s,
and si were calculated from Millner and Pratt (1989) using (3.34 - 6)Is, --24.28 and
(84 - 150)Is, - -13.37.
'o Sce also Shogren and Baik, who run a related experiment for R- 1 and find that the
Nash equilibrium dissipation hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 90 percent level.21
4. S[JNIII~IARY AND RESULTS FOR THE CONTIIVUOUS STRATEGY SPACE CASE
In this paper we have solved the original rent seeking game devised by Tullock for the
case where the rent-seeking exponent (R) exceads two. A oonstructive method was used to find
the explicit solution for the finite game (i.e, the TuUock game in discrete strateSY space). Our
theoretical n~ults, which establish that rents are under dissipated when R 1 2, accord well with
the existing experimental evidence. We also provide tight bounds on the rate of dissipation as
the mesh of the strategy space decreases.
Up to this point we have not addressed the solution to the infinite rent seeking game, i.e.
when the strategy space is continuous and R 1 2. It tums out the payoff functions in oquation
(1) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), guaranteeing the
existence of a symmetric mixed strategy oquilibrium for the rent seeking game with a continuous
stntegy space. The proof of their thoorem relies on finite approximation of the game and then
letting the grid size become finer and finer, as we did in our example with an infinite R. Thus
the construction of the equilibrium to the finite game in the previous section is driven to the
limit. Under sufficient regularity conditions this method indeed yields a solution to the infinite
game.
The application of Dasgupta and Maskin's Theorem 6 requires four conditions, each of
which is satisfied for the Tullock game with a continuous strategy space. In particular, this
thoorem re~uires: (i) The sum of the payoffs must be upper semi~ontinuous. From equations
(1) and (2) we easily see that U,(x ~y) t Uz(y ~ x) ~ Q- x- y, which is continuous and therefore
upper semi~ontinuous as well. (ii) The subset of discontinuities in the payoffs must be of a
dimension lower than 2, and one must be able to express the elements of this subset as functions~ 22
which relatc the strategy of one player to the strategy of the olher. For the Tullock game with
R c oo, this oondition is simple to check, as x a y~ 0 cx)nstitutes the only point of
discontinuity. Th~ condition guarantees that the discontinuities are relatively unimportant (have
measure zero). (iii) The payoff U,(x ~ y) must be boundod. This holds evidently as -Q 5
U,(x~y) 5 Q on [0, Q]. (iv) Finally, U,(x ~ y) must be weakly lower semi-continuous. The only
point where there could arise a problem is at the point of disoontinuity, but as U,(x ~y- 0) is
lower semi~ontinuous, it is oertainly weakly lower semi-oontinuous. This last condition
guarantees that, loosely spe.alvng, a player daes not want to put weight on the discontinuity point
even if the other player does, bccause payoffs may jump down but do not jump up.
Thus we conclude that a symmetric mixed strategy oquilibrium exists for the continuous
strategy space rent sceking game for all R~ 2 as well. An explicit closed form solution
remains for future invatigation. For the special case R- oo, a full characteriration of all the
equilibria is available even when there are more than two players; sce Baye et al. (1990, 1993).
Other interesting questions include the explicit solurion to asymmetric versions of the game, as
well as further ezperimental work along the lines suggestod above. These remain the focus of
our future research.23
APPENDIX
In this Append'u we show that the Ieft-hand-side of inequality (20) is posidve, while the
right-hand-side is negative.
Manipulate the right-hand-side as follows:
v.l ~ x - 2(v.x) ~~1~ ~ 0
l~41Vt ~ xR i
MN
1
(v.l ;xlr a j (v-l .x)(~r.l ~
a
1 a 2 ~
(1 . ~ ~.
ViX-1 C X
Note that the left-hand-side of this last inequality is decreasing in v. Hence, to show that the
right-hand-side of (20) is negative, it is sufficient to show that such is the case for v a 1.
Assuming that v~ 1, we can further manipulate the last inoquality:
1 t l;X j(1,~~-~
a
1; 1~ x ~(1 { z)(1 a X~ 2.
Evidently, for any R Z 2 and x 2 1
1 4 1 ~ 1~ 1.
1 ~ X X
Thus the right-hand-side is strictly negative for any v~ 1.
To obtain the left-hand-side result we need to show that for any t such that
Q-12t2xf1,24
~~1~ 2 Z ~a]~ ~R
4~41~` ; tR 4~~1~` ~ TR xR ~ tx~
Manipulation yields
[~~1~ t ~~MR ~ t~ ~ ~~~~1~ 4 tR~
FI
xR~~lyr ; tR~tlYr ' ~u ; ~rtR j ~R ~al~ t ~Rte
M
[(x~l~ - xx][t" - sxj j 0.
Because t Z x tl~ x, the left-hand-side of this lau inequality is unequivocally positive, and
hcnce the left-hand-side of (20) is non-negative.25
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